ter of these debates are various manifestations of gay marriage, including the erotics of desire and revulsion incited by these and other forms of same-sex relations. 4 In this article, I examine articulations for and against gay marriage, broadly construed, in the successful legalization of Bill 232 in Hawai'i and in the failed passage of Bill 185 in Guam to signal a profound ideological shift in the US colonization of these locations. 5 I liken this shift to a discursive and material process I call "homomilitarism," wherein the same-sex erotics of gay marriage have emerged to confront and reproduce the dominant paradigm of heteronormativity in the militarist and tourist industries of the Pacific. While these systems appear unrelated, I demonstrate how they, in fact, constitute a new discourse of US rule and representation in the post-9/11 Pacific. As the sociologist Lanny Thompson argues, the discursive and material relations of the American empire in the Pacific "were not entirely accidental nor arbitrary nor indeterminate, but rather [were] 'causal' in a historical sense. That is, variations in representation explain why rule was organized in certain particular ways and not others." 6 To this effect, the same-sex erotics of the US empire draw from these genealogies of rule and representation that, while diverse, nevertheless determine everyday, local, and regional interactions with state authority.
In this way, homomilitarism can be read as a contemporary brand of imperial discourse through which debates on same-sex rights, legislation, and marriage are vigorously advanced or restricted while simultaneously upholding US colonial rule in Guam and Hawai'i and marginalizing indigenous claims to these islands. It is a discourse that represents state-sanctioned ideals of queer citizenry, community, and leisure; for this reason, the same-sex erotics of gay marriage and gay tourism attempt to conceal historical and contemporary forms of violence attributed to the US military's presence in these islands. Contrary to the liberatory premise of homonormativity, then, I seek to explore how gay marriage, gay tourism, and US militarism consolidate Islamophobia, patriarchy, racism, and settlerism in the post-9/11 era. 7 I am thus concerned with how analyses of homomilitarism can help us triangulate and examine gay marriage, gay tourism, and US militarism as a new and complex discourse of citizenship and oppression in the contemporary Pacific.
I begin by discussing how homomilitarism emanates from a broader and ongoing reconfiguration of US nationalism in the aftermath of 9/11. I assess how it signals a new gendered formation of power in the Pacific where the rule of law (as militarism), the Christian practices of marriage, and the endorsement of tourism foster greater gay and lesbian participation in Guam and Hawai'i. I then explore the making of "civil unions" in Hawai'i and "domestic partnerships" in Guam, respectively. I discuss the ways in which Catholic religious leaders, indigenous scholars, policy makers, and queer activists interpret Bill 232 and Bill 185 in these locales -interpretations of gay marriage that, while infrequently expressed in the past, have become commonsensical in the post-9/11 era. I also take stock of how these cultural, legal, and political discussions appropriate Chamorro and Kanaka sites of public discrimination. 17 Reversing the military's homophobic and sexist policies soon became "a priority for advocates of gay and lesbian civil rights" in congressional hearings, military forums, and presidential campaigns. 18 By 1992 the question of homosexual military service became a "leading gay rights issue." 19 Signaling the turn to homonormativity, homosociality and homosexuality merged in ways -as a soldier, as a citizen, and as a person -that no longer restricted homosexuality to the single signifier of the "criminal," as in the recent past.
In Guam and Hawai'i, however, debates on the discriminatory practices of the military were not as widespread even though several air force, army, marine, and naval bases are located there. Yet, by the 1980s, their tourism industries had risen to regional prominence due to the representations of these islands as exotic, hospitable, and safe. 20 Whereas Guam mainly caters to audiences from Asia and, increasingly, Russia, Hawai'i serves a larger tourist base from Asia, North America, and Europe. From the vantage point of a global empire of military bases and tourist beaches, then, these islands constitute indigenous spaces where the erotics of the US empire are differently engaged and transformed. Coupled with the attractions of former World War II battle sites such as Pearl Harbor in O'ahu and the Asan Beach Unit in Guam, tourism industries have therefore supported the military as much as the military has welcomed the pleasure and leisure industries for its service personnel.
Because of the large presence of US militarism and tourism in these and other Pacific islands, the critic Teresia Teaiwa coined the term militourism to account for this gendered formation of state power. 21 According to her, militourism is a phenomenon "by which military or paramilitary force ensures the smooth running of a tourist industry, and that same tourist industry masks the military force behind it." 22 Employing the trope of native heterosexual womanhood, militarism portrays islands and islanders as in need of (white) state protection and security, whereas tourism renders islands and islanders as in excess of (native) heterosexual desires and utopias. As Teaiwa astutely observes, militourism can be read as the dominant gender paradigm before the war on terror. With respect to the US colonies in the Pacific, it is an erotics premised on the white, heterosexist, and racist legitimations for US imperial rule. 23 But how, I ask, does one address the rise of homonormativity in the Pacific in the aftermath of 9/11? 24 How does one critique the US reconsolidation of "borders" on the geopolitical bodies of its states and territories, on the sexual bodies of its citizens and subjects, and on the terrorized bodies of its enemies and outcasts? In Guam, military analysts now argue that the gun smuggling, money laundering, and people trafficking that occur in the island are linked to "terrorist activities" in Asia and Southeast Asia. 25 With the transfer of military personnel from Okinawa and the construction of new military facilities in Guam, the island is also experiencing another round of securitization because of fears of an impending terrorist attack. 26 Across the board, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Navy all endorse the further militarization of Guam, Hawai'i, and any overseas US port that may transit perceived terrorists to North America.
Departing from the Cold War rhetoric of "containment," the new mantra is one of imperial "flexibility" and "strategy" in terms of electronic surveillance, conventional warfare, and diplomacy as the threat of warfare. 27 In 2006 Admiral William J. Fallon of the US Pacific Command summarized the US position as such: "The No. 1 focus area in the Pacific is the war on terrorism. It is the No. 1 issue for our nation." 28 Given its national prominence, the war on terror has forcibly displaced Arab American and Muslim communities, wherein husbands, brothers, and sons have been unjustly detained or deported. 29 Whereas the conflict now violates the civil rights of these "suspect" groups, the war on terror continues to dispossess Chamorro and Kanaka Maoli political claims to their lands. 30 In Guam, for example, the military has identified Apra Harbor and Pågat as sites to develop an aircraft carrier facility and firing range, respectively; the military has also begun to forcefully seize lands in the neighboring islands of Tinian, Saipan, and Pagan.
And in O'ahu and the Hawai'i Island, the US Army has already acquired up to twenty-five thousand acres of land. 31 As the Kanaka Maoli anthropologist Ty P. Kāwika Tengan asserts, the war on terror "prompted the largest military landgrab in the islands since World War II as the army moved to transform its twenty-fifth infantry into a Stryker (light armored vehicle) brigade." 32 Yet Chamorros and Kanaka Maoli largely remain invisible in the US national imaginary due to the patriotic attitudes that construe these military acts not as violent land takings and indigenous deaths but as "noble" efforts to guarantee white security, settler desire, and national belonging. 33 As the scholar Aaron Belkin explains: "Many U.S. citizens perceive the military as a benign force in the world. But accepting the militarization of American society as an unremarkable phenomenon can be problematic, in part because of the central place of violence in military culture." 34 Precisely because of this general disavowal of state violence in the militarized sites of Guam and Hawai'i, many Americans view militarism and tourism in these islands as everyday logics and routines. 35 While indigenous agencies have partly receded from the US national imaginary, especially with respect to land stewardship and ownership, the case for samesex agencies proves otherwise in the aftermath of 9/11. As the critic Jasbir K. Puar elaborates, there is a "transition under way in how queer subjects are relating to nation-states, particularly the United States, from being figures of death (i.e., the AIDS epidemic) to becoming tied to ideas of life and productivity (i.e., gay marriage and families)." 36 As she reveals, the "politics of recognition and incorporation entail that certain -but certainly not most -homosexual, gay, and queer bodies may be the temporary recipients of the 'measures of benevolence' that are afforded by liberal discourses of multicultural tolerance and diversity" (xii). Same-sex national rec-ognition and inclusion are thus "contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary" (2), as in the genocidal erasure of Chamorros and Kanaka Maoli. By addressing the exceptional and national character of homosexuality, Puar advances the productive analytic "homonationalism." As she demonstrates, critiques of homonationalism can bring into focus "the global ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the United States as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality" (2).
Homonationalism therefore represents gay marriage, first, as a normal, popular, and white discourse of the state and, second, as a discourse of failed and perverse masculinities that casts gay marriage as tied to national, popular, and religious discourses of terror (xxiii). Here the link between gay marriage and terror is made explicit through narratives of the nation, where, on the one hand, gay marriage promises life for queer communities and, hence, greater inclusion in the nation. On the other hand, gay marriage incites "terror" and "moral panic" for nonqueer communities, particularly conservative organizations and religious groups. 37 In other words, heteronormative and homonormative paradigms of the United States, once deemed publicly as oppositional, now fuse, as Puar succinctly puts it, to "extend the project of U.S. nationalism and imperial expansion [which is] endemic to the war on terror." 38 In Guam and Hawai'i, the same-sex erotics of gay marriage, gay tourism, and US militarism cohere along the axis of homonationalism as well. Following Thompson, Teaiwa, and Puar, then, I want to advance these discussions on the same-sex erotics of the US empire by addressing an emerging, post 9/11 discourse that represents same-sex marriage, touristic leisure, and militarist security as natural and lawful. In the next sections, I show how Catholic religious leaders, indigenous scholars, policy makers, and queer activists in Guam and Hawai'i suture the language of gay marriage, gay tourism, and militarist security in complex ways. Public articulations for and against gay marriage -that is, civil unions and domestic partnershipsthereby affirm the violent relations between the native and the queer and between the law and the land. As a discourse, this is not to say that homomilitarism should be solely read as a negative ideology of individual liberation and statist violence in these colonies. But that is the case today in Guam and Hawai'i -a seemingly paradoxical context that begs further explanation.
Civil Unions and Bill 232 in Hawai'i
The language of "civil unions" that dominates the US public sphere is a product of the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court case Baehr v. Lewin. 39 The association between civil unions, same-sex rights, and the fiftieth state occurred in large part because of Hawai'i's local constitution, which, unlike the US federal constitution, guarantees the protection of its citizenry against discrimination based on ancestry, race, reli-gion, or sex. However, Baehr v. Lewin did not find gays and lesbians as a "suspect class," a legal phrase that, if accorded, would have represented same-sex persons, couples, and groups as historically discriminated against, as in the elevated and suspect category of race. 40 Instead, the court refuted the claim that the Hawai'i constitution provided a fundamental right to same-sex marriage; yet the court noted that the laws requiring marital partners to be of different sexes still constituted sex discrimination. 41 Through appeals, legislative debates, and a popular referendum, the court's rulings were overturned to define marriage as between one man and one woman. 42 In lieu of these shortcomings, Hawai'i created the legal category of "reciprocal beneficiaries," which provides rights and responsibilities to same-sex couples and two single adults who are not eligible to marry. 43 These benefits include the rights of intestate succession and property interests, among others. California, Maine, New Jersey, and other states have followed Hawai'i, offering similar privileges for samesex partners despite the criticisms that civil unions treat them as "second-class citizens." 44 Nevertheless, Blake K. Oshiro, a former member of the Hawai'i House of Representatives and the current deputy chief of staff for the Hawai'i office of the governor, views civil unions as providing sufficient legal recognition for gays and lesbians. As he elaborates, "I argued that as long as I was in a position of power and influence, as one of the very few people controlling the destiny of our state's laws, I had to stand up for what was right." 45 In his capacity as a policy analyst for the Democratic Party, Oshiro has supported making civil unions one form of gay marriage. Reflecting on the history of same-sex legislation in the archipelago, he observes that, since 2000, a civil union bill "has been proposed every year in the legislature. The issue has progressed to committee three times. During this time, other bills, such as hate crimes and housing discrimination legislation, have passed" (163). By 2010 civil unions became a "pivotal issue" in the state's primary and general elections (165).
To this effect, the language of "civil rights" has permeated the public sphere in Hawai'i, informing the rhetoric of supporters and opponents alike in conferences, legislative testimonies, newspaper editorials, and online blogs. The president of Pride Alliance Hawai'i, Tara O'Neill, observed that "people are recognizing it's an issue of civil rights." 46 As Maria Lebron of Honolulu likewise attested, "We, as a society, are way overdue to instill the same legal marital rights for homosexuals that currently exist for heterosexuals." 47 Highlighting the contradictions in US militarism and democracy, she continued: "I find it deeply embarrassing that America, a country with a military base in ever [sic] other country -so willing to enforce democracy at gunpoint, is so lacking in equality and democracy itself. Every state that eliminates legal descrimination [sic] against homosexuals is one more step toward nation wide [sic] equality and justice for all." 48 The Church of Holy Innocents confirmed, as did the Episcopal Church, that civil unions are a matter of "civil rights and justice for all." 49 Unlike the Catholic and Mormon churches in Hawai'i that refute same-sex rights and gay marriage, several churches of Christian denominations have adopted both social justice and biblical approaches to the debates on civil unions. For example, Rev. Dr. Jonipher Kwong of the Metropolitan Community Church states that his congregation "has been performing Holy Unions for same-gender couples since 1969." 50 In a letter to the Hawai'i state legislature in 2009, he explains, "We believe the loving relationships of adult, consensual, non-related gay and lesbian couples are blessed in the eyes of God and ought to be celebrated by communities of faith and families and friends." 51 Cognizant of the legal and political significance of civil rights and sexuality, Kwong emphasizes that the "constitution is supposed to offer equal protection under the law and pay close attention to 'suspect' classes such as gays and lesbians, who are more prone to discrimination and unfair treatment" (1) . Yet, when he attempted to pair Kanaka Maoli notions of gender and sexuality with the language of civil unions, Kwong represented indigenous Hawai'i as an "ancient" and nonliving symbol of the past.
Kwong, in saying, "I would also encourage each of you, out of respect to the 'aina [land] , to go back to Hawaiian history, when mahu ('two spirit' people who were ancient equivalents of modern-day gays and lesbians) were treated with the utmost dignity and respect" (2), conflates the mahu with the "two spirit" people of Native America. Insisting on a native Hawai'i of the past, Kwong describes the mahu as having "embodied that delicate balance between the earthly realm and the spiritual realm" and explains that "they were shamans and chief advisors to ali'i [chiefs] because of their unique sensitivity" (2). Comparable to queer appropriations of "two spirit" people in North America, such as the berdache, Kwong's comments reflect the "desire of white sexual minorities to absorb Native American roots as their own in order to claim -even critically -the rights of settler citizenship." 52 Lost in the discussion are contemporary Kanaka Maoli articulations of the mahu, or native transgender females and gay men. 53 Even Equality Hawai'i, the largest organization for Honolulu's gay and lesbian communities, has subscribed to the myth of a dead or dying native society. Referring to Kanaka Maoli sexuality as a utopia before the arrival of Captain James Cook and other Europeans in the eighteenth century, Donald L. Bentz of Equality Hawai'i remarked: "Before Capt. Cook, Hawaiians embraced, nurtured and encouraged its mahu and aikane [intimate friend]. It's time that we return to this time-honored island tradition of acceptance and equal employment opportunity for all Hawaii's residents. Please affirm the American dream to our next generation." 54 Whereas some queer activists are invested in the "American dream" and its attendant colonial logics, many Kanaka Maoli underscore communalism, genealogy, and rank in their relationships with blood relatives, gods, and partners, as in the practices of ho'okama (to make a child), hā nai (to feed), awaiā ulu (to bind securely, fasten, as of the marriage tie), and ho'ā o (to stay until daylight). 55 In this respect, neither heterosexual nor homosexual marriages represent the complexity of Kanaka Maoli genders and sexualities, of which the mahu and aikā ne constitute two identities. Of course, marriages still persist. But the emphasis on cultivating relationships with the Kanaka Maoli often becomes misrecognized in the legal notion of a citizen imbued with the rights of the US settler state. However, the homonationalist erasure of Kanaka Maoli from the language of civil unions has not come without native interventions. While Kanaka Maoli have played a marginal role in the making of same-sex rights and legislation, a few native scholars have attempted to contextualize civil unions within a Hawaiian context. For example, the Kanaka Maoli language professor Samuel Kaleikoa Ka'eo observes that "next to sovereignty, the most controversial issue facing Hawai'i is the issue of same-sex marriage." As he asserts: "We need to speak about the issues of sexuality and same-sex marriage with a Hawaiian voice, a Kanaka Maoli voice. Especially those of us who are involved in Kanaka Maoli political struggles have been silent about the whole issue. I believe this is a failure on our part, and by proclaiming any support I hope that others will support this issue." 56 By offering assistance, Ka'eo explained: "I am not talking about granting lesbians and gays the right to marry, but about re-imagining the institution of marriage. We need to include Kanaka Maoli values in the concept of marriage. If same-sex marriage becomes legal in Hawai'i, it should be viewed by Kanaka Maoli as a window of opportunity." 57 For native scholars and grassroots organizers like Ka'eo, Kanaka Maoli "should follow the lead of the proponents of same-sex marriage because it gives [them] the latitude to reshape societal institutions to fit [their] cultural standards." 58 While not enthusiastic about reinforcing the heteronormativity of marriage, he and other native scholars view the civil unions debates as offering a potential Kanaka Maoli -and queer-inspired reimagination of a sovereign lā hui, or Hawaiian nation. As the Kanaka Maoli political theorist Noenoe K. Silva elaborates, "We don't want to live in a new nation that is just as oppressive to us as the old one." Freedom should enable Kanaka Maoli, she argues, to "live in our land . . . live in our bodies [and] . . . live in relationships that may be different from American culture." 59 Yet despite the plurality by which Kanaka Maoli advance their goals, their important focus on the reclamation of their lands and their language has inadvertently marginalized native calls for solidarity with advocates for civil unions. Nor have queer activists publicly linked their concerns with the Kanaka Maoli sovereignty movements beyond a few meetings; sustained relationships are thus not usually fostered between the two groups. The American Friends Service Committee, one of the organizations responsible for supporting native and queer discussions, faults a lack of cultural understanding on the part of the broader lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movement. As the committee notes, "The larger
LGBT movement did not understand the importance of protocol, courtesy, and the establishment of trustworthy relationships in this regard, and so an initial opportu-nity to build those relationships was lost. The larger LGBT movement did not have an understanding of Kanaka Maoli history or the struggle for decolonization and sovereignty from a Kanaka Maoli perspective." 60 As a result, the sovereignty movements have occasionally problematized the "myths of universal inclusion" that the "
LGBT movement" purports to represent. 61 These myths partly persist because of Hawai'i's local constitution and its strong consideration for sex (and other identity categories). Clearly, the debates on civil unions have thrived not because of the mutual misrecognition between native and queer claims for freedom. Rather, the Hawai'i legislature, by virtue of its constitution, must address same-sex unions in terms of the benefits they can afford and the safeguards they can receive. As Oshiro declares: "What this essentially means is that sex is given the highest protection under the law. When legal arguments are made for discriminatory law, such as a ban on same-sex marriage, the law must advance a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." 62 But precisely because of these constitutional safeguards, several of Hawai'i's secular and religious organizations have attempted to present a compelling state interest via protests, referendums, and public hearings. Casting queers as symbols of perversion, they often represented gays and lesbians as threats to the security and sanctity of Hawai'i and the settler nation.
In their entirety, these homophobic sentiments urged the state to ban all civil unions for fear that gay and lesbian parents will medically, religiously, or socially harm children. Homosexuality as AIDS, for example, was a noticeable narrative, as in the response by Margaret Scow, a citizen, wife, mother, and business owner. As she proclaimed, "I have seen a Transvestite dying of AIDS and it was not a pretty sight. Hawaii does not want Civil Unions because it will bring an increase in STD's, HIV, AIDS and other diseases that result from homosexual relationships." 63 Former California resident Susan McIntosh was equally explicit in her opposition to civil unions, arguing that "practicing gays and lesbians" sexually abused infants and children. 64 As recent as August 22, 2013, Bishop Larry Silva of the Catholic Diocese of Honolulu heeded this brand of homonationalism when he said:
If same-sex marriage becomes the law of the land, its implications will go far beyond the relationship of this or that couple. . . . Our school textbooks will have to portray sexual attraction as normal, no matter to whom one is attracted. When schools have dances, boys will have the choice of inviting a girl on a date or another boy on a date. Our youth, whose sexual identity is formed over time, will be forced to decide prematurely if they are heterosexual or homosexual, thus curtailing normal sexual maturation. . . .
Children will be the greatest casualties, in that they will be deprived of being raised in a loving home by a mother and a father who loves them and whose love cooperated with God's plan in creating them.
As he advised, pray "at all hours . . . so that just as God tumbled down the walls of Jericho, he will be able to do so through the prayers AND ACTION of his beloved people." 65 As in other conservative organizations, the Catholic Diocese of Honolulu used inflammatory rhetoric to instill fear, ignorance, and hatred regarding civil unions. Over the past decade, the diocese has officially opposed civil unions for these reasons: (1) marriage does not have to be redefined to care for unmarried people; (2) marriage between one man and one woman is recognized and endorsed by the US government; (3) civil unions for same-sex couples are just a stepping stone toward redefining marriage; and (4) civil unions are a desperate and dishonest attempt to force gay marriage on Hawai'i. 66 As the executive director of the Hawaii Catholic Conference, Walter Yoshimitsu, elaborated, the "people of Hawaii and the majority of [their] elected officials" believe that the benefits provided in reciprocal beneficiaries, the procreative potential of heterosexual relationships, and the then US government endorsement of marriage as between one man and one woman demonstrated the nonnecessity of civil unions in Hawai'i. 67 Yet the diocese revealed more than its antagonism toward same-sex rights and legislation. With children perceived as in need of protection, a position that purported to represent a "compelling state interest," the diocese actually demonstrated its diminishing influence in legal and political matters. As the political theorist Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller asserts: "Children serve as the surrogates for an embattled majority that has lost its voice in the tactical maneuverings of the legal process. Children are not just imagined as the victims of civil rights, but also as models for thinking out the proper limitations of citizenship." 68 Indeed, the diocese failed to justify a compelling state interest to discriminate against gays and lesbians, as evidenced in the making of the latest version of civil unions, Bill 232.
As the bill stipulates, "The intent of this measure is to recognize civil unions in Hawaii. By establishing the status of civil unions in this State, it is not the legislature's intent to revise the definition or eligibility requirements of marriage." 69 Concerning the section on benefits, protections, and responsibilities of Bill 232, it is written, "Partners to a civil union lawfully entered into pursuant to this chapter shall have the same rights, benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law, whether derived from statutes, administrative rules, court decisions, the common law, or any other source of civil law, as are granted to those who contract, obtain a license, and are solemnized pursuant [to chapter 572 on marriage]." 70 On matters of annulment, divorce and separation, however, military personnel are exempt from and made exceptional to the jurisdiction of the family court. As the bill elaborates, "A person who may be residing on any military or federal base, installation, or reservation within the State or who may be present in the State under military orders shall not thereby be prohibited from meeting the requirements of this section." 71 While this exemption might be viewed as a trivial clause, simply granting 72 Equality Hawai'i, another endorser of Bill 232, similarly invoked the narrative of war-refugee-turned-citizen. As one of its members proclaimed, "When my own family came to this country from Saigon in the midst of a war, we knew we could aspire to success, because, regardless of our place of origin, all American citizens are entitled to equal opportunity." 73 In some respects, these comments demonstrate that homomilitarism functions in Hawai'i, a discourse that has taken fuller shape since the advent of gay tourism.
Although it was a marginal market before 9/11, gay tourism has recently increased its advertising schemes, economic projections, and sexual representations. As early as 2008, for example, Hawai'i's private sector began to brand gay tourism. Michael Person of Panda Travel explains that "the statistics are out there that show that the gay and lesbian community are frequent travelers and that Hawaii [is] one of their favorite destinations." 74 Reverend Fay Hovey of Aloha Maui Gay Weddings concurred, stating that gay partners "have that fantasy just like any other couple, to come and have a wedding and a honeymoon. . . . When they come to Hawaii, everybody can relax in their spirits and feel included." 75 The chair of the Democratic Party's Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Caucus, Jo-Ann Adams, agreed: "Gay travel is an $84 billion industry worldwide. If we capture just 1 percent of that, it would solve the state's deficit problem." 76 The testimonies for Bill 232 comparably evidence this brand of homomilitarism, wherein "aloha" for civil unions and gay tourism is a common theme. As the educator Joel Beck remarks: "As long as Hawaii is without a civil unions bill, we communicate to the world that in the land of aloha, some families are less equal than others. This is not a message that is consistent with Hawaiian culture or other local traditions of hospitality." 77 As Gene Corpuz, a gay Filipino American and another proponent for gay tourism, says: "Passing civil unions would stimulate the economy due to increased tourism from same gender couples who want to have a civil union in Hawaii as well as others who support the aloha expressed by the passage of this bill. There would also be an increase in business related to civil union celebrations (florists, caterers, party planners, etc.) and additional revenue to the State of Hawaii collected from civil union license fees." 78 As in Bangkok, Chicago, and Sydney, gay tourism has become a global enterprise since 9/11, wherein what was once a mostly private industry has expanded to include municipal and national support in establishing gay travel destinations. 79 Representing the Hawaii Tourism Authority, President Mike McCartney expressed this sentiment: "We don't discriminate. We're known for having tolerance and mutual respect for all. . . . Our natural beauty, people and spirit create an environment for romance." 80 In Hawai'i, the rhetoric of an idealized native homosexuality and a multicultural environment of "aloha" now constitute a nexus where local and regional flows of queer community and consumerism converge. Contrary to the presumed inclusivity of gay tourism, however, discrimination actually persists in at least three ways.
First, in the marketing of Hawai'i as ethnically "Hawaiian" and "queer," the tolerance and respect that gay tourism purports to offer marginalizes Kanaka Maoli claims to place and society, if not alternative nodes of citizenry and sovereignty. Second, as in the practice of official tourism in Australia and Europe, the rhetoric of gay tourism often assumes an audience that is "disproportionately white, affluent, male, and educated, an image that circulates as the dominant representative of gay ethnicity." 81 Third, discrimination concerns settler colonialism in Hawai'i, wherein whites already constitute the dominant ethnic demographic in the archipelago. As the social anthropologist Jonathan Y. Okamura asserts, whites "have been the largest group since the 1960s as a result of considerable in-migration from the continental United States following statehood in 1959." 82 They are distinguished as "local haole," "mainland haole," or "military haole" -three identity categories that variously represent white belonging and settlerism in Hawai'i. 83 If gay tourism primarily welcomes white, middle-class tourists, then the prospects for reinforcing the economic, political, and social inequalities in Hawai'i profoundly increase given that whites, Japanese Americans, and Chinese Americans control the educational fields, state government, and private businesses. 84 As the Hawai'i branch of the American Friends Service Committee demonstrates, the tourism industry "depends upon a low-waged labor market that exploits many workers, especially women and youth. In the long term, a tourism economy displaces indigenous and poor peoples from their own lands and neighborhoods, turning them into a servant class for more affluent people." 85 Yet this is the group targeted by Sumner La Croix, a professor of economics, in his observations that same-sex couples prefer to have their commitment ceremonies in Hawai'i and not in "the dreary Oregon rain." 86 La Croix, in his study of civil unions and economic development in California, Hawai'i, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont, opined that "civil unions in Hawaii are likely to generate small positive impacts on tourism arrivals to Hawaii and government revenues." Based on statistics regarding the relationship between visitor days and consumer spending, he estimated, in 2007, that over "43 percent of the visitors coming to Hawaii to get married and over 49 percent of the visitors coming to Hawaii for honeymoons were from the United States." He added: "Consider that civil unions are currently legal in states with 16.7 percent of the U.S. population. If Hawaii received 3 percent more visitors from these states consisting of same-sex couples coming to Hawaii for a civil union or a civil honeymoon, then 11,969 additional visitor days would be generated." La Croix also alleged that if each visitor spent $174 per day, this amount would generate $2.1 million from civil unions and $3.5 million from civil honeymoons alone. 87 Naomi G. Goldberg, R. Bradley Sears, and M. V. Lee Badgett of the Williams Institute at the University of California, Los Angeles, similarly endorsed the economic promise of gay tourism. In 2010 they prepared a report for the Hawai'i state legislature that outlined the projected benefits that civil unions and gay tourism would provide. Drawing from their interdisciplinary training in law, history, and psychology, they explained: "As same-sex couples enter civil unions, businesses in Hawai'i will experience increased spending on civil union celebrations. We estimate that over four years, these couples will spend between $4.2 million to $9.5 million on their civil union celebrations. This estimate is just of spending by the couples themselves." 88 But rather than specify one or more ethnicities that represent these couples, the authors preferred the phrase "creative class" to describe the demographic of same-sex partners. As they stated, the creative class entails a "mix of individuals in occupations including financiers, software engineers, artists, teachers, and scientists, who represent a key to regional economic development in today's post-industrial and global economy." 89 Following Richard Florida's notion of a "creative class," they described these individuals as "generally young, highly educated, mobile, and . . . more likely to value innovation and diversity." 90 As these examples reveal, academic, personal, and state-sponsored proponents of gay tourism rarely disclose how tourism sustains violent economic, political, and social relations to the land, its native people, and its working-class residents. Instead, representations of the homosexual as the symbol for "terror" persist in the public sphere, thereby shaping homomilitarism as a discourse that guarantees statesanctioned ideals of queer citizenry, community, and leisure so long as so-called perverted sexualities are repressed. On February 23, 2011, Governor Abercrombie signed Bill 232 into law, thus affirming the homomilitarist ordering of civility, desire, and settlerism in Hawai'i. Up to that time, none of the previous governors endorsed legislation for civil unions.
Reflecting on his decision to support civil unions, Abercrombie remarked: "Under current law, a heterosexual couple can choose to enter into a marriage or a civil union. . . . A same-sex couple, however, may only elect a civil union. My obligation as Governor is to support equality under law. This is inequality, and I will not defend it." 91 As Abercrombie expressed, the "signing today of this measure says to all in the world that all are welcome -that everyone is a brother and a sister in paradise." 92 Elated by this landmark bill, the president of Dignity USA -Honolulu, Tim Earhart, proclaimed, "I, with my own two eyes and ears, got to witness this historic moment when lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and questioning people are now elevated to the status of ordinary citizens." 93 On January 1, 2012, Bill 232 became law, allowing gay and lesbian couples to enter into civil unions in Hawai'i.
Domestic Partnerships and Bill 185 in Guam
As in the state of Hawai'i, the same-sex erotics of gay marriage, gay tourism, and US militarism converge in the territory of Guam. As part of this discourse, Chamorros and other residents of the island are experiencing another influx of militarization with the transfer of military personnel and technologies of warfare from the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa to the US colony of Guam. In fact, before being appointed governor of Hawai'i, Abercrombie previously had worked for two decades in the US Congress, where he both criticized and supported the military. For example, he protested against the Vietnam War in 1970 and the Persian Gulf War in 1991 because of the violence that these American incursions brought upon, respectively, the peoples of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Yet, for reasons not publicly disclosed, he advances the militarization of Hawai'i and other US colonies in the Pacific. 94 In 2009 Abercrombie furthered the militarization of Guam in his attempt to secure construction contracts and employment for US citizens rather than for non-US citizens. As a member of the US House Armed Services Committee, he remarked: "Relocating thousands of military personnel and their families is a massive undertaking, and will dramatically alter Guam's future. Building a new military base from scratch will take several years and billions of dollars. The project will offer thousands of local jobs, thousands more from outside, create opportunities for local small businesses and transform the economy of the island." 95 "This is a huge opportunity," Abercrombie emphasized, "to put Americans to work, in an American territory, building an American military base." 96 In the end, his proposal was revised to require that contractors first recruit US citizen laborers before considering others.
What remains clear, though, is that Abercrombie -both in his former role as a congressional representative and in his new capacity as the governor of Hawai'i -materially links the successful passage of Bill 232 in Hawai'i to the failed establishment of Bill 185 in Guam. Although he has not publicly compared the two bills, his support of civil unions in Hawai'i and US militarism in Guam demonstrates the seemingly paradoxical ways that American rule and representation operate in the Pacific. Just two months before his signing of Bill 232 in February 2011, moreover, the Guam legislature refused to deliberate Bill 185's notion of "domestic partnerships." As the correspondent Mindy Aguon noted, the "highly-controversial Bill 185 . . . never made it to session floor." 97 Unlike in Hawai'i, where the debates on civil unions have lasted since the late 1990s, the public deliberation on Guam's Bill 185 occurred for a period of barely a year and a half, from the summer of 2009 to the fall of 2010. Despite these differ-ences in time and duration, homomilitarism presently connects these archipelagoes in ways that sustain debates on the civil rights of gays and lesbians in the Pacific Islands. That one bill successfully grants same-sex couples the civil rights of marriage, whereas the other bill does not, has less to do with the future of queer domesticities. Instead, the same-sex erotics of the US empire now informs the future of the American military colony, a future that is rooted in indigenous claims to law and society as well. Whereas Kanaka Maoli rarely contributed to the making of civil unions in Hawai'i, an effort primarily led by non -Kanaka Maoli residents, in Guam Chamorros and others supported domestic partnerships.
The main person in this effort is Senator Benjamin J. F. Cruz (also known as "B. J."), a gay Chamorro man who has lived in California and Guam. Over the past four decades, he has been raising awareness about gender and sexuality issues. As a student at Claremont Men's College in California, for example, Cruz "was instrumental in starting the school's first gay and lesbian club" in 1972. 98 Writing for the Advocate, journalist David Silva described him as a "handsome young man with big political aspirations [who] first publicly acknowledged his sexuality" in California. 99 Chamorro performance aside, Cruz became a legal adviser for Guam's Democratic Party, followed by his appointment as a justice of the Supreme Court of Guam. He is currently a senator for the Guam legislature, a position that has allowed him to continue addressing the economic, political, and social inequities in the island. On same-sex rights, he remarked: "I used to speak at high schools to the human sexuality classes, because it really bothered me that when they had speakers on homosexuality, they would inevitably invite only drag queens and hairdressers. Not that there was anything wrong with it, but I wanted the gay students to know they could be something else besides drag queens and hairdressers." 102 But while educational meetings proved instructive and meaningful, Cruz preferred the force of the law and its potential for eliminating homophobia and sexism. Reflecting on his decision to craft Bill 185, he said: "This has to be done by the [Guam] legislature, because as we've looked through history, we cannot allow the tyranny of the majority to dictate and deny the civil rights of the minority. If we were to do everything by referenda, or by popular consensus, we'd still have slaves in this country, women wouldn't be able to vote, women probably wouldn't be able to work." 103 With white supremacist histories as his referent points, Cruz depicted a multicultural nation that has risen above its violence through the language of the law.
In his selective interpretation of the law, Cruz also conflated the distinct histories of discrimination among people of color, queers, and women, as if legal histories of racism had nothing to do with the histories of homosexuality, except as precedents. 104 Nor did he employ Chamorro notions of "homosexuality" in his justification to create Bill 185, as with the mamflorita ("little flowers"; gay men) or manmalalahi ("women acting like men"; lesbians), let alone acknowledge the indigenous traditions of women's power in Guam. 105 Even with his knowledge of these indigenous values, Cruz chose to elevate the laws and histories of civil rights because of their presumed universalism in Guam, Hawai'i, and the United States. 106 Clarifying his position, Cruz argued: "There has to be a distinction between marriage and matrimony. Marriage is a civil responsibility, the civilian government is responsible for that. That's why I purposefully just addressed this as a civil union." 107 Further, he claimed: "I'm not addressing the sacrament of matrimony, which is one of the seven sacraments of the Catholic Church. They have control over their sacraments. I insist that I have control -or the legislature has control -over marriage."
With his sense of autonomy, Cruz drafted Bill 185, "Domestic Partnerships" on July 20, 2009. Comparable to Hawai'i's Bill 232, the Guam version of civil unions construed "rights and obligations" as follows: "Partners to a domestic partnership lawfully entered into pursuant to this Chapter shall have all the same rights, benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law, whether derived from statutes, administrative rules, court decisions, the common law, or any other source of civil law, as granted to spouses in 19 GCA Chapter 3 (The Contract of Marriage)." 108 As with husbands, partners, spouses, and wives, domestic partnerships included "every reference to marital status, including without limitation provisions pertaining to parties and procedures for annulment, divorce, separation, or dissolution." 109 But unlike Bill 232, which exempts military personnel from heeding to the provisions on annulment, divorce, and separation, Bill 185 contains no equivalent clause about or special privilege for military personnel in Guam or elsewhere.
In the public sphere, however, Bill 185 more clearly illustrates the relationship between domestic partnerships and US militarism. For instance, attorney Bill Pesch, an activist for same-sex rights, celebrated the passing of Bill 232 in Hawai'i, as well as lauded the military's repeal of "don't ask, don't tell" policy on December 16, 2010 . In Pesch's view, the US military is responsible for furthering same-sex rights, a notion that has become commonsensical in the aftermath of 9/11. Reflecting on the military as a "harbinger for social change," he observes: "If you look at any of the major social changes in the United States over the past several decades, whether it be gender equality, racial equality, and now . . . sexual preference and equality, the military has always led the way." With respect to Guam, Pesch remarks: "Exercise your conscience. Get behind . . . a civil rights movement and encourage our senators to do what is correct -and that is to get behind a bill that will recognize same-gender relationships." 110 Tim de la Cruz, the president of Guam's Alternative Lifestyle Association (GALA), reiterated the importance of civil rights in the US colony of Guam. As he explains: "At the end of the day, this is a civil rights issue. . . . Whether you believe homosexuality is right or wrong, it comes down to looking at those basic guarantees that the law provides." 111 Comparably, April San Nicholas, a Chamorro resident, asserts: "I am asking for the freedoms, rights and benefits afforded to heterosexual couples. I want the equality that is my right as a U.S. citizen and as a citizen of the island of Guam." 112 Even the Pacific Daily News, a Guam newspaper known for idealizing US militarism, adjusted its conservative platform to further same-sex rights and legislation. As the editors note: "Bill 185 is important civil rights legislation that needs to be passed into law. . . . Champions of this cause must not waver from doing what's right -to ensure that each and every citizen is entitled to the same rights and privileges." 113 Annie U. Bordallo, a Chamorro medical doctor, expands on the significance of establishing domestic partnerships in Guam. She begins by acknowledging her relationship with her partner, Ellen Bez: "Not once in the past 16 years has anyone questioned my right to exist in this community. My relationship is not illegal -my relationship is protected as a basic and fundamental constitutional right." Elaborating on this point, Bordallo states: "Our Community has accepted, not rejected [emphasis in original], the relationship I have with Ellen. I am proud that our community has evolved far beyond the days when same sex couples were the object of scorn, intolerance, ridicule or worse." "Granting us the rights and benefits of civil unions," she continues, "is merely the logical progression of a movement towards social acceptance and proper recognition of individual liberties and individual rights, regardless of sexual orientation." Aware of the global flows of same-sex rights in Guam, Bordallo observes: "The legal benefits provided by Bill 185 do not break new ground. Similar laws recognizing civil unions and domestic partnerships have been established in numerous states and countries around the world." 114 Clearly, as these middle-class sensibilities demonstrate, same-sex rights and legislation increasingly occupy the national spaces of colonial and postcolonial archipelagoes around the world. 115 But what makes indigenous articulations of gay marriage in Guam and, to a lesser extent, in Hawai'i simultaneously radical and restrictive are the local emphases on kinship and community. Here native bids for gay marriage seek to protect both the individual and the family. Whereas civil rights discourses tend to treat freedom as a state-oriented project of protecting aggrieved individuals and groups, indigenous appropriations of same-sex rights in Guam attempted to reshape native notions of "adoption" to explicitly compel Chamorros and others to acknowledge the rights of and their communal obligations with samesex individuals and partners. In US legal contexts, poksai is the Chamorro term that has come to define "adoption," wherein people are absorbed into an extended family, the clan. 116 But as the anthropologist Laurel A. Monnig ascertains, poksai broadly means "to nurture" in the Chamorro language, if not "to welcome." 117 Usually with the assistance of a grandparent, then, poksai involves a clan's decision to include the accepted and rejected members of society. Children out of wedlock, distant relations, estranged siblings, the second-born grandchild, and others can be accepted by Chamorro extended families. As in Hawai'i, Tonga, and other Pacific Islander societies, Chamorro "bodies" -that is, their clans -determine their collective health and wealth by the extent to which they can support and receive support from people. 118 Although individuals rarely mentioned the term poksai, given the dominance of the English language as the lingua franca of civil rights, the concept was nevertheless featured in the rhetoric to support same-sex rights and legislation in Guam. Poksai was thus the subtext in native and local calls for domestic partnerships. As Maya Alonso observes: "The family unit on Guam has always been remarkably amorphous. We embrace our extended family; we adopt a distant cousin; we live with a partner, unmarried; a grandchild is often reared in the home of grand parents, providing each with a necessary support system." 119 Yet couples of the same gender "frequently find themselves excluded from certain rights and benefits that married couples find readily accessible." 120 Michael Sepidoza Campos, a high school teacher, similarly argues that Bill 185 "makes perfect sense within a community that subverts traditional categories of Western (individual-based) relational ethos." 121 As he opines, "We live on an island where all are 'aunties' and 'uncles'; where the care of our manamko' [elders] is a communal duty -not that of one's immediate family alone, where nephews and nieces bear as much accountability to an aunt/uncle/ neighbor as to one's parents."
In these articulations for domestic partnerships in Guam, the "family" does not signify heterosexual monogamy. As Campos explains: "The so-called 'traditional nuclear family' that most defend does not, really, reflect much of the expansive familial structures that have undergirded Guam's community for generations. Perhaps rather than threatening Guam's familial structure, this bill offers a creative way to protect what we already live, breathe and embrace within the richness of our culture." 122 Andy Tidwell, a former inhabitant of the "Bible Belt state of Georgia," similarly likened Chamorro society to an "accepting culture." 123 More forthright, the Chamorro sociologist Lili Perez Iyechad put it this way: "This is a difficult issue we are discussing. . . . Voting to 'recognize' [same gender] relationships allows us . . . to embrace the change that is upon us." 124 As these examples reveal, three major themes emerge in the support for Bill 185: first, that Chamorro society accepts same-sex relations and partners in keeping with the native custom of poksai; second, that civil rights constitute a "logical progression" toward the attainment of freedom and liberty; and, third, that Chamorro articulations of same-sex rights and legislation contribute toward local and global conversations about gay marriage in the aftermath of 9/11. These articulations for domestic partnerships in Guam thus reflect changing attitudes and practices about what represents Chamorro society. Herein lies a radical potential to imagine a postcolonial Guam, wherein bodies may be tied to a nation without militarism and a state of perpetual war.
Yet this liberatory potential remains an ideal given the restrictive and violent contours of homomilitarism, a discourse that renders various manifestations of gay marriage as presently interwoven with gay tourism and US militarism. Invoking the island's tourist mantra, "Guam, where America's day begins," other supporters of Bill 185 demonstrate this homomilitarist predicament in their respective spinning of the phrase as "Guam . . . where America's equal rights begin" and "Guam, where American justice begins." 125 While transforming a tourist slogan into calls for domestic partnerships might seem benign, these acts naturalize the status quo of US militarism in Guam and link US empire to gay tourism. Although not as pronounced as in Hawai'i, gay tourism has become a topic of discussion in Guam since 9/11. Gay tourist blogs, for example, frequently depict the island as a "safe" haven for queer communities -that is to say, safe from the relative absence of local "hate crimes," safe from the homophobia of the national media, and safe from the perceived enemies of the US nation.
As in Hawai'i, the US militarization of Guam presently adheres to a homonationalist agenda, both in its capacity to nationally recognize queer soldiers and sailors and in its ability to represent islands as homosexual sites for desire and leisure. In November 2003, the correspondent Richard Ammon of the GlobalGayz website described Guam in the following terms. Coupling the island's wartime past under Japan with the island's wartime future with America, he wrote: "In late November this speck of a Pacific island experienced an invasion quite different from the one it received sixty-five years ago at the hands of a brutal Japanese Army. The similarities between the recent and historic landings were slight but visible in that the newer one also took place from sea and involved military personnel deployed from huge gray ships. But the mission now was peace and R&R." 126 For Ammon, "rest and relaxation" arrived in the form of the USS Kitty Hawk, a navy aircraft carrier that boasted six thousand sailors, "enough to take over every palm fringed beach and disco on this tiny tropical island." "But the Kitty Hawk," he interjected, "was not just bringing another shipload of straight boys headed for the girlie stripjoints, massage parlors, karaoke bars, Hard Rock Café and Planet Holly wood. Discreetly among them were hundreds of gay and bi sailors who had also been at sea for months since the invasion of Iraq." With the "mini proliferation of LGBT venues" in Guam, Ammon assured his readership that clubs like "Denial" and "Euphoria" would entertain the sailors and others. As he expressed, "When the Kitty Hawk landed, Guam's tourist population probably grew instantly by 10% and Denial welcomed the queer boys and girls with specific themed parties." "Eventually, there will be a dramatic change in the gay life here. In the next few years, the marines stationed in Okinawa will be relocated in Guam. According to reports, roughly 7,000 marines will arrive. I think we all know what marines are about!" 127 Without his reference to the US military, Ammon's comments merely reflect instances of queer desire and leisure in Guam. But by choosing to represent the military as a necessary component of gay tourism, then we can understand how homomilitarism maintains US imperial rule. In the debates about domestic partnerships, however, gay tourism only occasionally surfaced as a topic of contention, partly because of the homophobia advanced by the Catholic Church. Even though local banks such as the Bank of Guam expressed their willingness to discuss how the legalization of gay marriage would enhance gay tourism, the hate speech of the Catholic Church and its conservative membership deterred gay tourism from becoming a popularly endorsed economic venture. 128 Being the majority religion accounts for its hegemony. 129 Consequently, domestic partnerships in post-9/11 Guam are construed as moral threats that Catholics must reject. Writing for Umatuna Si Yu'os: The Pacific Voice, Guam's Catholic newspaper, Father Francis Michael Walsh asserts that domestic partnerships constitute "homosexual acts," forms of nonmarital sex that are "detrimental to society." 130 The late Jeff Barcinas, a Chamorro deacon, clarified that the "church teaching is consistent and uniform throughout the universal church, and with Guam we have to share the truth in terms of what the church stands for with regard to civil union and with regard to what this legislation is putting forward as an issue for Guam." 131 Yolanda Nangauta, another Chamorro against Bill 185, even likened domestic partnerships to ideals that have no relationship to Chamorro society whatsoever. As she proclaimed: "We as a Chamoru people do not have to follow what everyone else is doing. Remember this: wrong is wrong. . . . Never mind that every other country or state has recognized civil unions, they are NOT CHAMORUS nor do they make up our island." 132 Indeed, neither the language of civil rights nor the Chamorro practice of poksai could assuage some Chamorros from expressing vulgar forms of homophobia. If petitions represent an endorsement of indigenous and local heterosexisms, then the seven thousand signatures offered by supporters of the Catholic Church illustrated how they would negate their familial practices of acceptance. 133 Archbishop Anthony Sablan Apuron, the highest member of the clergy, organized the making of these petitions, much like how he castigated individuals who refused to adhere to his dogma. On October 19, 2009, for example, he shared a polemical response to Bill 185 that was distributed by the media. In his pastoral letter, he asserted: "Islamic fundamentalists clearly understand the damage that homosexual behavior inflicts on a culture. That is why they repress such behavior by death. Their culture is anything but one of self-absorption. It may be brutal at times, but any culture that is able to produce wave after wave of suicide bombers (women as well as men) is a culture that at least knows how to value self-sacrifice." 134 In his representation of "Islamic fundamentalists," Apuron then placed Bill 185 within the context of an orientalist East pitted against a civilized West, as if to say that Chamorro, Muslim, and queer articulations of gay marriage remained outside the US polity. As he stated, one does not "have to agree with the gruesome ways that fundamentalists use to curb the forces that undermine their culture to admit that the Islamic fundamentalist charge that Western Civilization in general and the U.S.A. in particular is the 'Great Satan' is not without an element of truth." To stress his exclusionary motives, Apuron treated Bill 185 as a form of indigenous violence, yet disavowed the statist violence of Chamorro soldiers in the Middle East. As he surmised: "It makes no sense for the U.S. Government to send our boys to fight Al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan, while at the same time it embraces the social policies embodied in Bill 185. . . . Such policies only furnish further arguments for the fundamentalists in their efforts to gain more recruits against the 'Great Satan.' " "At stake," the archbishop warned, "is nothing less than the implosion of the moral culture of the people of Guam." 135 As in debates about Bill 232 in Hawai'i, Apuron and other conservative members of the Catholic Church represented Bill 185 as "the devil" actively working in Guam. 136 But unlike Hawai'i, where the Kanaka Maoli have not officially discriminated against Muslim peoples in any legal or religious capacity, Chamorro forms of Islamophobia have surfaced to constitute "a historical genealogy that comprehends Islam as the antithesis of Western modernity and that further perceives Islam as a threat to modernity and democracy and the freedom that they bring." 137 Before 9/11, no public version of native Islamophobia existed in Guam. During the period to deliberate Bill 185, however, several Chamorros invoked what the critic Junaid Rana calls a "new racism" that places Islam as an enemy in Europe and the United States. 138 As correspondent Gerry R. Partido observes, "The church itself has been using strong language in attacking Bill 185, declaring homosexuality as a sin, warning of eternal damnation should the legislation be passed, and even throwing in Islamic fundamentalists into the discussion." 139 Another journalist and former Guam senator, Jess Lujan, demonstrated how Chamorro Islamophobia is tied not only to racism but also to homomilitarism. In his critique of the archbishop's pastoral letter, he argued that Apuron's statement "seems to excuse, or perhaps even advocate, violence against homosexuals. . . . This incitement to violence can be inferred from the Archbishop's seeming endorsement of the Muslim Fundamentalists' practice of murdering homosexuals. This is wrong." Likening Muslim fundamentalism to Nazi fascism, Lujan continued: "Secondly, the Archbishop seems to have commented approvingly or admiringly about Muslim Fundamentalists' practice of suicide bombing. This is wrong. I disagree with the Archbishop's position that Muslim Fundamentalist suicide bombers are engag-ing in an act of self-sacrifice. Their act of homicidal suicide is the ultimate act of selfishness, and represents the culmination of a depraved set of beliefs and ideals, much like how the Nazis who willing [sic] killed and died for Adolf Hitler's Nazi ideology." Making explicit the discourse of homomilitarism, he chastised Apuron for disrespecting "our men and women in uniform who have been murdered by suicide bombers." Instead, Lujan proffered: "These men and women in uniform, who put their lives on the line for love of country . . . are true examples of self-sacrifice. . . . Many of our men and women, including many homosexuals, have died in defense of these ideals. This is the kind of self-sacrifice I admire, and I believe, so does our community." 140 The issue of native self-sacrifice also informed how de la Cruz, GALA's president, would interpret Apuron's racist and sexist remarks. As de la Cruz noted, "[Our families] are deeply hurt by the Church's claim that homosexuality is simply a culture of self-absorption and that LGBT persons are incapable of making selfsacrifices and that the culture of homosexuality is nothing more than a culture of death." Speaking on behalf of LGBT persons in Guam, he said, "Many of us care for aging parents, care for family members living with HIV/AIDS (even when they have been rejected by society); we are social workers, doctors and military personnel." 141 In their responses to Apuron, Lujan and de la Cruz rightly critiqued his homophobia. But by naturalizing Chamorro soldiering, "self-sacrifice," and US militarism, they issued varying degrees of Islamophobia. Whereas Lujan clearly linked native heterosexual and homosexual soldiers to the war on terror, de la Cruz merely applauded native homosexual participation in the military.
On October 22, 2009, four days after the dissemination of Apuron's pastoral letter and the elicitation of these responses, he apologized. He said, "I want to make it clear that persons with same-sex attractions were not the target of my Pastoral Letter, nor was it meant to condemn anyone in any way." Realizing the extent of his violence or fearing the onset of discrimination lawsuits, Apuron relented, "If I have hurt anyone, please forgive me." 142 In contrast to these forms of homophobia and Islamophobia, Senator Cruz attempted to find a middle ground amid the language of civil rights, the native custom of poksai, and the conservatism of the church. As he explained: "Guam's bill is domestic partnership, unfortunately. It is not the marriage, it is not the civil union. I have promised the Archbishop . . . not to use either one of those two words though the bill does provide the same benefits that married heterosexual couples receive." 143 As such, Cruz amended Bill 185 to accommodate the competing ways in which same-sex relations could be codified into law. GALA, for example, recommended that Bill 185 should acknowledge only same-sex partners who share a common residence and commit to a lifetime relationship, among other markers of monogamy. 144 As GALA announced, "Considering the recent community divisiveness regarding Bill No. 185, we believe incorporating these amendments will make Bill No. 185 acceptable to the majority of our residents and will restore our island community's reputation for tolerance and acceptance." 145 But because the Guam legislature revoked Bill 185, these efforts to create "acceptable" domestic partnerships did not materialize.
Homomilitarism
As I have shown in my analysis of Bills 232 and 185, we can turn to the discourse of homomilitarism to examine why and how the US settler state grants civil rights for some queers while maintaining its empire of military bases, advertising Hawai'i and Guam as homosexual paradises, and marginalizing Chamorro and Kanaka Maoli political agencies. The debates on "civil unions" and "domestic partnerships" thus reflect the new and complex ways in which the indigenous and settler peoples of these islands engage the same-sex erotics of the US empire during the war on terror. As articulations for and against gay marriage demonstrate, certain law-abiding same-sex couples are granted recognition so long as the perceived "terrors" of perverse sexualities are repressed; other expressions of gender and sexuality are devalued and made disposable. 146 With respect to Hawai'i, same-sex partners are represented as a new identity category through which gender equity, tourist viability, and militarist security are guaranteed. Whether construed as part of a "civil class" or a "creative class," advocates for civil unions in Hawai'i often support rather than challenge preexisting forms of economic, political, and racial inequality. In this respect, a series of legal and political relations now benefit same-sex partners in terms of sharing medical insurance, private property, and social capital. Yet the erotics of civil unions portend a future of cultural citizenship in terms of white desire and belonging in Hawai'i, thereby usurping the Kanaka Maoli sovereignty movements and disrupting the diversity of nonwhite and working-class nodes of being and thinking. But if queers and their allies seek to disrupt white heteropatriarchy and settlerism, then they must abandon their racist understandings of Kanaka Maoli as dead or dying in an attempt to foster cross-gendered, cross-political, and cross-racial solidarities. They could learn from the case of Guam, where without their discursive and material ties to US militarism and gay tourism Chamorro articulations for domestic partnerships invoke the native custom of poksai and reimagine the family in radical terms.
The pedagogy of a critical praxis is mutual as well, as the Kanaka Maoli sovereignty movements must advance nonexclusive and nonnormative representations of the family if they are to imagine a postcolonial society without a militarist empire. 147 As the Kanaka Maoli political theorist Noelani Goodyear-Ka'ō pua suggests, social movements should move "away from a politics of demand (that puts the settler state at the center) and toward resurgent practices of independence and selfdetermination (that put the interdependence of land and people at the center)." 148 Such an endeavor would compel groups to foster interdependent gendered relations with the Kanaka Maoli, a generative beginning for decolonizing the peoples of Hawai'i. 149 In Guam, the kind and degree of "fear" that underscored conservative proponents of Hawai'i's "compelling state interest" did not have a counterpart in the island. While the Catholic Church vehemently demanded that its congregation protect the "family," very seldom did its homophobia and Islamophobia intentionally target children. Nevertheless, debates about Bill 185 created images of Chamorro soldiers -"men" and "women" alike -sacrificing their lives for US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, much like how the making of a bill on domestic partnerships spurred both pride and contempt in people's perceptions of homosexual participation in the military. And although the Guam legislature refused to deliberate Bill 185, this does not mean that another variation of gay marriage will not resurface in the near future. Disappointed but upbeat about his efforts, Cruz attributes the bill's failure to not having enough vocal support from the local legislature and the island's gay and lesbian community. 150 Here queer advocates and their allies in Guam can learn much about the successes and limitations of transnational organizing from gay and lesbian associations not only in Hawai'i but also in Aotearoa New Zealand, Fiji, and South Africa. 151 They can ascertain why and how postcolonial societies critically recognize same-sex rights and legislation.
Should indigenous and local calls for gay marriage in Guam move in this direction, then perhaps the discourse of homomilitarism could be turned on its head so as to accommodate critical futures outside the US settler state. For now, however, homomilitarism functions as a new gendered formation of power wherein the intertwined discourse of gay marriage, gay tourism, and US militarism cohere to guarantee life for some members of the nation in the aftermath of 9/11. This negative ideology of power is limiting to say the least. But by identifying the discourse of homomilitarism and analyzing its violence in Guam and Hawai'i, then perhaps we can cultivate an erotics without empire and collectively work toward a demilitarized Pacific.
Notes

